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La"1 and Tecbno\ogica\ Change: 
The case of Weather Modification 
j arnie Barris 
\ntroduction 
"°'encan socielY lS profoundlY wcnnolo9c'1 and 
prof oumilY lei.alistlc. We look to 1ecnnoMY as the p•th 
to p<Ollre" lo<• betW< life, and \nc.e..WPY we seetn to 
look to th• lei.al sysretn to conuol teclutol~gic'1 ch•nge 
,.d solve the rn.nY soc\'1 problems thut SI''° of! f•orn 
out "pr Oil'•"·" \lo"'"'", • ci\t\c'1 •n'1Y~' ~f th• role of 
the lei.al system in one episode.of tec1utolol'/c'1 
innovotion dOCS not g>ve cause lo< •n opurn1sttc 
assessnient of ou• app•""'' f'1ith in the c•P,,;ty of. ou• 
lei.al \nstitutloDS to guide tec1utolo,,le<1I ch'"!'.' r>t10n.UY 
unde< rules {nuned af"' .epresent>tion of the whole 
giunut of .,1,,.nt v.iues ,.din"'""· 'fhe ana1Y~' 
p•esented he" strong\Y sul!W''" that ou• present legal 
systetn is fundamentallY bi•sed "1 cert•\n st••""'" .,,ys 
which systernaticallY f,vo• tec1utolo9cal val•" and 
discdmin•te •i.ainst oth•"· 'fhe result is that new 
1ec1utologi" rnaY be legitimized by th• legal systetn and 
adoptod bY soc\•t)' without realistic con~deratio• of 
important related problems. 
'fhe" conclusions adse {<otn •study of the •ole of th• 
lei.al systetn in th• aeve\oprnen t of weather modiftca•o• 
tec1utologY· for the puspose of studying the ,ole of th• 
lei.al sY'""' \n wc1mo\ogical ch>Ulge, W?•th" modlfi<A> 
non is •n ,.cellent ex"°Pte of innoVation fo• ,.,..,a1 
reason•· Fi"'' th• deve\oprnent of capability to 
.,nu••"' th• .,.,me• is qui"••"' .nd •"'"still a"''"" 
of dispuW· Thu' the scientific bosi' lo• the techniques 
and eviOe•" for o• ,.,,.inst thei< development'" not 
settled. Secondly, unlik• sotn• teclutical innovations, 
such as"'"'° w•nsplan"· where only a s<0all p~tl of th• 
population is eve• li\<CIY to be affected,"" qu,te cl•" 
that la~• nutnb•<' of people w\\i be aflecte_d •n rnanY 
w.Y' by anY inwnt1onal weathe' modlficatio<I· 1'\U<d, 
e"'O w\1<0 just barely Qeveloped, weathe< ,nod<flcat\OO 
technolO!lY caul')lt th• "'"rest of government •I vonous 
\eve\a. Ile<:'""' of th"" three fa<:to<S an ,.al1"" of the 
role of th• legal system in th• aevelopment ?I thi• 
wcnuologY is able to take account of th«• 1mpo•ta•l 
question" I) Whal ldnd of scieuUflc kPowledf.' o• oth" 
;
0
[onnatiOO en"" legal decisions on t\W sub)ect1 2) 
Whal kind of representation ts given to div•"" pubbC 
in\e<"sts1 and 3) Whal iS the impact of spe<tal 10teresl 
po\itiCS on th• lei.al sysrern's perfonn"'"1 
Jami' """" IB a third year snuf ent at Yale VJW School 
1'\Us study indicates that while th• legal system bas 
euerW'tiC.UY contribU ted to the devel•P'°'nt of weathe< 
modif\cati•• tec1utologY it has don• so .,.th""' 
_,,.uent of th• scienti!\c medts of the question, 
with"°' ••Presentation of a wide""!'.' of communilY 
values, and wilh g«•' ;nfluence [<om pro-technolo!ll' 
special interest po\itics.
1 
The gene<al conclusion that th• legal systetn nas 
consistently r.voied techno\ogica\ innovation in W?atl«• 
conttol will be developed \n Qetail by focusing on th• 
rule and policy '°'king wo<k of legisl•tu<CS, cou«s, and 
ter;U comm••"'""· fo• convenience di,cuSo'ion" 
27 
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divided into three parts, each focusing on a different 
arena of legal activity. First we will look at Federal 
policy in the field of exposition and analysis, then turn 
to state legislation, and finally examine the courts and 
professional commentators. In each area after outlining 
the nature of the commitment to technology displayed 
in the policy and rules adopted, we will attempt to 
discuss the sources of that commitment. 
Before beginning this task however, it would be useful to 
set forth some general background on weather, weather 
modification techniques, and some of the potential 
impacts of the new technology. 
I. Weather and Weather Modification 
Although the "weather" which impinges on people in 
their daily lives is usually perceived as a local phenome-
non it must be recognized that all the weather we 
experience is part of an intricately interconnected global 
system. The global weather system circulates vast 
amounts of air, moisture, particulate matter and energy 
over the whole surface of the earth; a given mass of air in 
the stratosphere will circle the globe in about fifteen 
days at the latitude of the United States. Almost 
incalculable amounts of energy are absorbed into the 
weather system from the sun and distributed by various 
mechanisms. For example, heat energy representing the 
energy required to vaporize sea water is released by the 
condensation which forms precipitation. It is estimated 
that through condensation a single thunderstorm can 
release as much energy as a megaton hydrogen bomb and 
that there are between 1,000 and 2,000 such thunder-
storms on the earth every day. Thus the energy 
represented by daily thunderstorms alone is almost 
beyond comprehension. 
It is hardly surprising therefore that weather and climate 
have played a vital role in shaping the nature and 
distribution oflife as we know it as well as the physical 
features of the earth's environment. It is ironic that 
much of the concern that has led to greater attempts to 
understand the weather system has been stimulated by 
man's unintentional modification of weather and climate 
by pollution of the atmosphere, deforestation, 
urbanization and other activities. For example, it is 
estimated that due to man's phenomenal rate of 
consumption of combustible fuels in the last century the 
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has 
increased at about 3.2 per cent per year over the 
period.2 The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmos-
phere has a direct influence on average temperatures of 
the earth because of its absorbtion of thermal radiation 
from the earth's surface. 
Another source of inadvertant climate modification 
which has led to more intense study of the global 
weather system is the dust emitted by industry and 
other human activities. In 30 years dust content in the 
air at alpine Davos, Switzerland has increased 88 per 
cent and at Hawaii's Mauna Loa Observatory-thousands 
of miles from any significant concentration of heavy 
industry-dust has increased 30 per cent in IO years. 3 
Just what the potential future consequences of such 
increases may be are not known but both marked 
warming or cooling trends are proposed under differing 
theories. 
Urbanization also is proving to have a significant impact 
on weather. With up to 30% less sunlight than surround-
ing rural areas cities also have significantly more fog and 
more rain than the countryside around them.4 Airflow 
and thermal characteristics of the urban environment are 
significantly altered by the concentration of pavement, 
buildings, and heat sources. 
These and other kinds of inadvertant weather changes 
are not the subject of this paper, however, and hereafter 
all discussion of weather modification will refer to 
purposeful attempts to intervene in natural weather and 
climate processes. 
It is, then, in the setting of a globally interconnected 
air-moisture-energy transfer mechanism in which man is 
already unintentionally making significant unknown 
interventions that the development of intentional 
weather modification techniques must be considered. 
Through one means or another man has long attempted 
purposefully to influence the weather. Magical ceremony 
and religious supplication seem to have been the 
methods of longest standing. 5 Various explosive and 
incendiary devices were frequently used by 19th century 
"scientists." 6 Weather modification as an application of 
scientific knowledge of atmospheric phenomenon had its 
birth in the Massachusetts field laboratories of the 
General Electric Company in 1946. Atop Mt. Greylock 
in the Berkshires, Langmuir and Schaefer performed 
historic cloud seeding experiments based on a theory 
derived from prior studies of cloud physics. Their results 
seemed to confirm suggestions that artificial nucleation 
of super-cooled clouds could induce precipitation. 7 In 
these early experiments dry ice crystals were used as 
artificial nucleii. However, further experimentation by 
G. E. scientists showed that silver iodide particles could 
also serve as nucleating agents in cold clouds. Because of 
availability and ease of distribution this is the substance 
most widely used and experimented with in "cloud 
seeding" today, though a large number of other 
materials have been found to be effective artificial ice 
nucleii. 
From these small beginnings, weather modification 
research has grown to sizeable proportions. Today the 
term weather modification embraces numerous 
activities, among which are: 
I. Precipitation augmentation ("cloud seeding" or 
"rainmaking") 
2. Fog dispersal 
3. Hail suppression 
4. Lightning suppression 
5. Cyclone supression 
6. Modification or deflection of hurricanes 
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The various phases of weather modification have been 
taken over by different agencies and are at different 
stages of development. For example, the Department of 
Defense has been .running "Project Stormfury"-an 
attempt to develop hurricane modification techniques-
for a number of years. The U.S. Forest Service is 
interested in lightning suppression as a means of forest 
fire control while state and federal agricultural agencies 
are pursuing hail suppression as a means of reducing crop 
destruction. Though a great deal of study has been done 
in these latter areas, there is little significant evidence of 
successful intervention in natural processes.8 Claims 
based on supposed visually observed effects have been 
made, but sound statistical analysis has not yet produced 
verification. 
Fog dispersal has been the concern of the Air Force and 
commercial airlines and seems fairly successful with 
certain kinds of fogs. Dispersal of super-cooled fog at 
many airforts is now almost routine, but of little wider 
concern. 
For the present, this leaves attempts to manage 
precipitation as the most significant area of intentional 
weather modification both in popular understanding of 
the term and in actual application of research and 
technology. Widespread interest in "cloud seeding" 
followed almost immediately after the early G. E. 
experiments. In the early l 950's there was great flurry 
of private commercial "rainmaking" business. Practically 
anyone with an airplane, a pilot's license, and a silver 
iodide generator could become a rain maker. It is 
estimated that during these years as much as 10% of the 
land area of the nation was subject to such operations. 10 
Results were highly questionnable, to say the least, 
especially when contrasted with the frequently 
extravagant claims of the hustling entrepreneurs. 
Accumulating evidence suggested that cloud seeding 
could even decrease precipitation in some situations. 11 
By the late 1950's the business was practically dead. 
In the meantime, however, the federal government had 
been aroused by the public interest in the matter and in 
addition to Department of Defense investigations during 
1951-53, a President's Advisory Committee on Weather 
Control was created in 1953. This committee was given a 
Congressional mandate to evaluate experiments in 
weather modification and make a comprehensive report 
to the President. In 1956 this report was published in 
two volumes. The only positive verification of the 
effectiveness of cloud seeding found after three years of 
study was stated thusly: 
"The statistical procedures employed indicated that the 
seeding of winter-type storm clouds in the mountainous areas 
of the western United States produced an average increase in 
precipitation of 10-15% from seeded storms with heavy odds 
that this increase was not the result of natural variation 
"12 
The findings of the report were debated back and forth 
with commercial operators on one side and skeptical 
scientists and statisticians on the other. 
In 1958 Congress directed the National Science 
Foundation to begin a research program to study cloud 
physics and related weather modification problems 
including the development of reliable methods of 
evaluating experimental results. The NSF program 
continued for ten years at a level of approximately one 
to two million dollars per year. Private commercial 
operations, though much reduced from the level of the 
early l 950's, continued through the l 960's. Numerous 
public utilities in the West were customers of commer-
cial operators in the hopes of increasing runoff from 
mountain watersheds behind hydro-electric generating 
stations. California's Pacific Gas and Electric Company is 
perhaps the outstanding example. 
The 1960's was a period of rapid growth in federal 
involvement in precipitation augmentation research. The 
Bureau of Reclamation in the Department of Interior 
has been the "lead" agency in the field. Starting out 
with a $100,000 appropriation in 1962 the bureau now 
operates its program at about seven million dollars a 
year. "Project Skywater," as the research and develop-
ment program is optimistically called, is run by the 
Bureau's Office of Atmospheric Water Resources in 
Denver, Colorado and is designed with early operational 
status as its major goal. 13 In addition to a multitude of 
contracted research projects, "Project Skywater" 
involves three major operational pilot projects; one in 
the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California, one in the 
San Juan Mountains of Colorado, and one in the 
northern great plains states. Each pilot project is an 
aggressive attempt to produce increases in natural 
precipitation. Although as we shall see weather 
modification today is enthusiastically supported by 
many, it is still greeted with skepticism by numerous 
scientific observers. Evidence of effectiveness of weather 
29 
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modification attempts has been subject to continuing 
debate. The basis of the problem is the inherent 
difficulty of measurement since even the maximum 
claimed artificial variations in precipitation are but a 
fraction of natural variability. Also, until recently very 
few of the recorded experiments were done with any 
kind of statistically sophisticated data recording. 
Complicating the measurement problem are serious 
remaining puzzles concerning the actual physical 
processes involved in natural precipitation. It would be 
fairly safe to say that the scientific community is split 
about 5~50 on whether or not there is acceptable proof 
of results at all. The most official pronouncement from a 
respected objective source to date was from the National 
Academy of Sciences: 
" .. there is increasing but still ambiguous statistical evidence 
that precipitation from some types of clouds and storm 
systems can be modestly increased ... The theoretical basis 
for seeding effects is still very crude because we still do not 
have an adequate understanding of the physical details of 
many basically important cloud processes."14 
This statement represents a middle position along a 
continuum of current opinion which ranges from 
scornful disbelief to enough strong conviction to support 
apparently profitable commercial' activities. 
Weather modification, then, is a technology still in an 
early formative stage. There appear to be few hard 
results, but knowledgeable predictions indicate 
potentially vast and perhaps rapidly approaching 
technical ability to alter weather phenomena. 
What can be said of the potential effects of weather 
modification? Clearly it is hoped that precipitation 
increases will lead to increased usable water supplies and 
resulting economic benefits to agriculture, industry, and 
land developments. Another anticipated result is 
lessening some of the destructive effects of certain kinds 
of weather. However, the intended beneficial economic 
effects are not the only foreseeable consequences. Some 
attention should be given to the kinds of "side-effect" 
that may be induced. 15 
For all of man's long experience with the weather very 
little is known about the influence of changes in weather 
on his behavior. However, there is information from 
which we can conclude that widespread weather 
modification would have impacts on human productiv-
ity, deviance and illness. Much more research must be 
done in these areas however: 
Studies have shown, for example, that changes in temperature 
and precipitation influence productivity and the incidence of 
crime and illness. Much of the work, however, has related 
principally to particular places and particular times. As yet no 
theoretical models have been developed which have general 
application. 16 
Psychological or emotional impact of weather and 
weather modification is an issue upon which only the 
most rudimentary inquiries are beginning to be made. 
It is clear that at least one part of the United States 
government anticipates and intends direct deleterious 
effects of some kinds of weather modification on human 
behavior. Recently attention has been drawn to the 
significant cloud seeding programs of United States 
military forces in South-East Asia. Evidently interfer-
ence in crop production, movement of equipment and 
personnel, and dampening of enemy moral are intended 
to result from military weather modification. 
A political problem of no small proportion can also be 
forecast should weather modification reach significant 
proportions. The problem is posed by the question-Will 
people be willing to trust decisions about weather 
making to the conscious designs of others? One 
commentator has half suggested the problem: 
A hurricane, for example, might be headed for a large urban 
area, with a population of perhaps two million people. It 
might be possible to divert the storm away from that area, 
thus avoiding millions of dollars of property damage and 
perhaps major losses of life as well. Such a diversion, however, 
might be accomplished only at the cost of some property 
damage and loss of life elsewhere .... Can decisions about 
modifying major storms be left to operating agencies, or 
should they be placed in the hands of the President and his 
advisors? ' 7 
What would be the impact on political pemptions and 
the prospects for democratic government of having 
leaders "play God" in such a way with phenomena 
which in the popular mind have always been beyond 
human control? 
Ecological effects of weather modification also demand 
consideration. We have only to recall the lesson of DDT 
and other hard pesticides to be warned that the hasty 
adoption of new technologies can lead to disasterous 
unintended ecological consequences. 17a 
The National Science Foundation has noted that: 
"Anything that has a general and significant effect upon plants 
and animals, making some more abundant, others less so, is of 
primary concern to mankind for it strikes at the very basis of 
human existence. Changes in weather and climate may be 
expected to have such effects. " 18 
It is therefore with some dismay that one learns that 
"there has so far not been a single biological field study 
completed and reported in the literature specifically 
designed to identify any aspect of the ecological effects 
of weather modification. 19 
Nevertheless some predictions have been made based on 
other sources of ecological knowledge. A feel for the 
"Will people be willing to trust decisions about weather 
making to the conscious design of others?" 
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variety of problems that can be expected to emerge may 
be provided by the following illustrative list. 20 l t should 
be noted that all of these ecological problems are 
realistically foreseeable as a result of the kind of rain and 
snow making which is in advanced operational experi-
ment stages today. 
1. As noted above the most advanced operational 
programs today (and those based on the least 
contested scientific evidence) are the winter 
snow-pack augmentation programs conducted by the 
Bureau of Reclamation in mountainous areas of the 
western states. It is predicted that these programs 
could significantly affect big game mammals such as 
deer, bighorn sheep, mountain goats, antelope, and 
elk. These animals are critically dependent on 
partially snow covered winter ranges. The size of 
herds depends directly on the quality of available 
winter range areas and increasing snow fall in such 
areas would reduce their forage and support capacity. 
Consequently there would be either decreases in 
wildlife populations or need for increased artificial 
maintenance and feeding of herds. (More likely both 
could result.) It should be noted that in addition to 
their aesthetic value such animals are highly 
important to many western local economies. 
2. Prolonged changes in weather and climate in a given 
area (even though relatively small variations) could 
easily result in localized species extinctions and 
consequent changes in the make-up of the eco-
community. What appear to be minor weather 
changes can be exaggerated in their ecological effects 
by competition between species in which such minor 
changes may take on decisive significance. Even 
though localized species extinctions may seem 
insignificant, world-wide trends in this direction from 
a variety of causes are already alarming. The Food 
and Agricultural Organization (F AO) has pointed out 
that: 
. . . the genetic resources of the plants by which we live are 
dwindling rapidly and disastrously. As development proceeds 
in the less advanced as in the more advanced areas of the 
world, the reserves of genetic variation, stored in the primitive 
crop varieties which have been cultivated over hundreds or 
thousands of years ... equipped with a seemingly inexhausti-
ble range of variation, have been and are being displaced by 
high producing and uniform cultivars .... At a time when a 
continuing rise in productive efficiency is more essential than 
at any other for our very existence, plant breeding and plant 
introduction are rapidly being deprived of the very raw 
materials upon which they depend.21 
3. Presently unpredictable effects on populations and 
distribution of insect pests, plant and animal diseases, 
and disease vectors of various types are to be 
expected as a result of weather modification. 
4. Changes in lake and stream ecology are predicted as a 
result of changes in precipitation rates, water 
temperature, rates of flow, etc. Erosion and turbidity 
would be expected to be affected as would popula-
tions of micro-organisms, plants, insects, and the 
higher links of aquatic food chains. 
5. It is expected that intervening human activities in 
response to weather modification would cause 
additional ecological effects. It has been shown, for 
example, that over-grazing of rangeland is very likely 
when livestock producers have an abundance of 
supplemental feed. This is because an abundance of 
such feed allows more animals to be kept through the 
non-grazing months. Hence it is likely, in the absence 
of careful range management, that precipitation 
increases in some western plains areas might lead to 
further deterioration of rangeland by increasing 
supplies of cultivated feed and hence the number of 
animals that the natural range forage has to support 
during the grazing season. 
6. The direct effects of cloud seeding agents themselves 
also have to be considered. As noted above, 
silver-iodide is the major cloud seeding agent now in 
use. Silver is a highly toxic metal, especially to 
micro-organisms. It has been shown that a variety of 
organisms concentrate silver from their environment, 
but so far little is known about the effects of silver 
on these organisms. However, the widespread 
dispersal into the environment of a biologically 
concentratable toxic heavy metal is not an activity 
which many ecologists view with sanguinity. 
These are only a few of the kinds of effects that 
competent observers have forecast as likely to flow from 
weather modification. The disconcerting theme that 
unifies all such discussions, however, is the appalling lack 
of knowledge. We simply do not know enough to 
confidently predict the consequences of widespread 
weather modification. This alone would seem to counsel 
caution in advancing the technology. 
' 
Having presented this all too brief background on 
weather, weather modification, and its potential results, 
I would like to move to the main concern of this 
paper-the role of the legal system in technological 
innovation in this field . 
II The Role of the Legal System 
The general conclusion that the legal system has favored 
development of weather control technology was stated 
in the introduction. We now turn to the discussion of 
that observation. 
It is through the generation of rules and policy favorable 
to weather control (and technology in general) that the 
contribution of the legal system to technological 
innovation is made; at each major level of law making 
the policy and rules produced are almost without 
exception strongly pro-technology. 
A. The Federal Government 
As noted in the brief discussion of the development of 
weather modification technology, the federal govern-
31 
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"We simply do not know enough to confidently predict the 
consequences of widespread weather modificatons." 
ment has played a leading role. While research in the 
field started in the private sector it was not long until 
the vast majority of all research was being done under 
the auspices of various federal agencies: the National 
Science Foundation, the Defense Department, the U. S. 
Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and 
especially the Bureau of Reclamation in the Department 
of Interior. The latter agency has the lion's share of all 
federal appropriation in the field. 22 (It is interesting and 
perhaps significant to note that among all the numerous 
boo~ and articles read in preparation of this paper, only 
one discusses the Bureau of Reclamation program in the 
field.) However, in addition to the direct financial 
comrnittment to research and development, two special 
features of the federal effort should be carefully noted. 
In the first place, even though there have been repeated 
calls for legislation ever since the President's Advisory 
Committee Report in 1956, no general federal law 
concerning administration or regulation of weather 
modification has been passed. This sixteen year hiatus is 
quite remarkable when one considers the multiple 
agency federal involvement, the obvious potential 
interstate impact of weather modification, and the 
widespread recognition of the many potential "side 
effects" discussed above. 
Not only has no regulatory legislation been enacted, 
there has been noticeable opposition to such proposals 
on the ground that they would place obstacles in the 
path of technological development. For example, in 
1969, S 1182, the "Weather Modification Commission 
Act," was introduced in the Senate. This bill called for 
the creation of a nine man commission "to study the 
need for regulation and coordination in the field and the 
appropriate areas of responsibility for the federal 
agencies/' 23 Putting aside the usual distaste for new 
commissions, this seems like a sensible beginning on a 
very complex governmental problem. Yet at least one 
commentator sympathetically notes, "this bill caused 
concern among some government and other people in 
the field who feel that it would unnecessarily delay 
development of weather modification." 24 
More important than the failure to adopt regulatory 
legislation however, is the nature of the affirmative 
action which has been taken. This brings us to the 
second point: the allocation of the federal effort in 
weather modification research and development is 
neither to agencies with special expertise in meteoro-
logical science nor to those charged with pursuit of 
anything like "pure science" in general. The NSF studies 
begun in 1958 were terminated by Congress in 1968 so 
that currently the agencies in charge of federal weather 
modification research are all typical examples of the 
so-called "mission-oriented" bureaucracies. As noted 
above, the major agencies in the field are the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Agriculture Department, and the 
Bureau of Reclamation. The intensive "applied science" 
orientation of these agencies is well known. Thus former 
Commissioner of Reclamation Floyd Dominy explained 
how scientific research is to be subordinated to 
"practical" technological goals in his bureau's Project 
Skywater: 
"We aren't a research outfit; we are an action outfit. I decided 
to farm out all the research to others, to universities, to 
research firms. We'll put our engineering knowhow at the top 
to guide it. " 25 
That engineering knowhow has itself been guided by the 
singleminded goal of early practical application of a 
precipitation augmentation technology "as rapidly as 
possible consistent with sound engineering princi-
ples." 26 
Given these two general observations one conclusion 
seems inescapble. The federal government has produced 
a policy of rapid development of weather modification 
with the least possible "interference" from either rigid 
scientific discipline or legal-administrative regulation. 
That policy is backed by the yearly expenditure of 
millions of dollars. It bears emphasizing that this policy 
preference was not and is not based on objective 
consideration of results of comprehensive scientific 
investigation. Indeed, at the time that the Bureau of 
Reclamation project was being given its first major 
appropriations meteorological scientists were cautioning 
against just such expansionist programs. For example in 
1964 the Committee on Atmospheric Sciences of the 
National Academy of Sciences reported that on the basis 
of the best scientific evidence available "the initiation of 
large-scale operational weather modification programs 
would be premature." 27 Similarly, the National Science 
Foundation noted in 1965 that $1.1 million had been 
authorized for Project Skywater for fiscal year 1965 and 
stated that this happened at a time when "Many 
atmospheric scientists-perhaps the majority now 
engaged in research in this country-view the move 
toward large-scale engineering and development efforts 
in weather modification as premature." 28 Nor has the 
state of scientific skepticism changed significantly in 
recent years, 29 though with the termination of the NSF 
research program the federal policy seems, if anything, 
to have shifted even more directly in favor of rnission-
oriented technology development. 
This one sided policy development requires explanation. 
At first look one might seek to subsume such a result 
under a general federal committment to cechnological 
development. Thus one would look to such documents 
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as President Kennedy's Memorandum on Government 
Patent Policy of October 19, 1963. To the heads of all 
executive departments and agencies the President 
stressed that "the Government has a responsibility to 
foster the fullest exploitation of the inventions for the 
public benefit," and the "technological advances ... 
(should be) brought into being in the shortest time 
possible." 30 But reflection would suggest that such a 
general policy statement may well be the result of 
cumulative specific policy choices rather than the cause 
of such choices. In the case of weather modification 
more revealing analysis is possible. 
The strong pro-technology response of federal policy in 
the field of weather modification is best explained in 
terms of the identifiable political pressures and interests 
shaping legislative choices. It is reasonable to suggest 
that a neutral administrative policy (as opposed to a 
pure development policy) would be framed to consider a 
variety of values and interests including many such 
diffuse and general public concerns as ecology, financial 
integrity of operators, protection of the public from 
effects of possible deleterious substances emitted into 
the atmosphere by cloud seeders, aesthetic interests in 
weather, and, of primary concern, the vexing question of 
who shall make decisions that may change the weather 
for thousands or millions of people. While the history of 
regulatory agencies does not leave one entirely 
convinced of the prospects for their continuing 
dedicated service of public interests rather than special 
interest groups, at least at their birth the recognition of 
the diffuse or general public interests is supposed to be 
in the forefront. The mobilization, organization and 
communication of such interests to the law making body 
is necessary to get regulatory legislation passed. Quite 
simply, in spite of scientific concern, public awareness of 
weather modification and its various problems and 
prospects has not reached such a level as to stimulate the 
kind of organization and communication required. On 
the other hand there are identifiable highly organized 
special interests working for a narrow pro-technology 
policy, and the relevant federal law making institutions 
seem quite easily swayed by them. 31 
The strongest of these organized special interests seem to 
be of two basic types, each intertwined with the other. 
The development of federal policy in weather modifica-
tion can be seen as a response to first, the special 
bureaucratic empire building interest of the mission 
agencies involved, and second to the special interest 
constituencies of those agencies. The illustration of this 
point will be made with reference to the Bureau of 
Reclamation since it is the lead agency in the field and 
the one about which there is substantial information 
available. 32 
Weather modification research and development was 
brought within the domain of the Bureau of Reclama-
tion by the political skill of former Commissioner Floyd 
Dominy. Until his retirement about two years ago, 
Dominy was reknowned in Washington as a consummate 
politician with many influential friends in Congress. One 
of these was Senator Francis Case of South Dakota who 
became interested in weather modification in 1960 after 
being approached by commercial cloud seeders in his 
state. Finding out about this interest, Dominy reacted 
quickly; he admits today that he worked to encourage 
Case and expand his agency by urging initiation of a 
Reclamation sponsored research and development 
program. 33 The early Congressional appropriations were 
spearheaded by Dominy and Case "with the understand-
ing that a good portion of the work should go to South 
Dakota." 34 Today, although in retirement, Dominy is 
convinced that continuation of Project Skywater is vital 
to the bureau he loves; he sees a bright future for his 
former agency "if they don't take weather modification 
away from us." 35 The latter statement takes on 
considerable additional freight when compared to the 
statements of informed obseivers that the role of the 
Bureau of Reclamation may well be substantially 
completed and that serious thought should be given to 
dismantling the agency. 36 
Not only does weather modification serve to expand the 
Bureau's empire, it is seen as holding out hope of 
correcting serious past errors and thus averting growing 
criticism of Reclamation. This was at least tacitly 
admitted by Mr. Dominy in testimony before the Senate 
Irrigation & Reclamation Sub-Committee during 
hearings on Project Skywater: 
"The design of (Bureau of Reclamation) water facilities has 
been based upon historical records of streamflows. Failure to 
secure streamflow of the magnitude contemplated in the 
original plans has serious implications in terms of both service 
and financial committments of the system. We are particularly 
aware of this situation now in the case of the Colorado 
River."37 
An even clearer example of the use of a technological 
development program as a defense of agency interests is 
seen in one of the three "pilot projects" currently in 
operation under Project Skywater. Pyramid Lake in the 
State of Nevada is fed by the Truckee River which heads 
in the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California. In turn the 
lake feeds one of the hottest controversie~ faced by the 
Bureau of Reclamation. In 1905 the B~reau built the 
Newlands Reclamation Project which draws its irrigation 
water from the Truckee River. Pyramid Lake has been 
shrinking steadily ever since. The lake is the sole 
commercial asset of any worth for the Piute Indian 
Reservation in which it is located. As the lake slowly 
dries up, so does the economic future of the Indians 
whose livelihood is largely dependent on the lake and 
the formerly bountiful supply of trout and recreational 
fishing that it once supported. The Indians and their 
representatives have been fighting a losing battle to save 
the lake for 6 7 years. 38 
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Thus, Pyramid Lake has been a source of considerable 
embarrassment for the Bureau and for the Secretaries of 
Interior who have to deal with the problem. The federal 
government and especially the Bureau of Reclamation 
have consistently refused any realistic protection of the 
Indians' rights and interests. But finally Project 
Skywater has allowed the Department and the Bureau to 
stand up and assert that they are doing something about 
the Pyramid Lake problem. They are doing one of their 
pilot projects in an attempt to increase winter snowpack 
in the headwaters region of the Truckee River thereby 
hoping to augment the water supply for Pyramid Lake. 
The top man in Project Skywater quite flatly states that 
the decision to undertake the Truckee pilot project was 
a political decision made by the to~ bureaucrats rather 
than a scientifically based choice. 3 "If they don't take 
weather modification away from us" echoes louder and 
louder. 
Another indication of the dynamics of bureaucratic· 
empire interests in shaping policy on weather modifica-
tion is to be seen in the history of various proposals for 
general legislation on the subject. 
While we noted above that there has not been considera-
ble public organization in favor of regulation, failure of 
Congress to go beyond development project appropria-
tions is not due to other types of bills not having been 
introduced. Another Capitol Hill friend of Commissioner 
Dominy's (and of Reclamation in general) is Senator 
Anderson of New Mexico. From 1960 to 1968 he 
introduced numerous bills on weather modification. 
Each one would have greatly expanded the Department 
of Interior's work in the field and created regulatory 
powers under the Secretary of Interior. These bills were 
routinely referred to the Senate Commerce Committee 
(Anderson sat on the Interior oriented Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee) where, presumably under the 
influence of other agency interests, they quietly died 
without action. 40 The conflict between Interior and 
Commerce was emphasized sharply in 1966 when two 
bills were before the Senate. Senator Anderson's S. 2875 
favored the Department of Interior as usual, while 
Senator Magnuson's S.2916 called for extensive 
atmospheric research and development of a broad 
administrative regulation system under the Department 
of Commerce. Attempts at compromise were made to 
get around the agency rivalry (which sprung up in 
response to the proposals), but eventually the amended 
S.2916, though passed in the Senate, died in the 
House. 41 It is at least open to suggestion that the 
continuing conflict between potential parent agencies 
and their respective Congressional sponsors is a 
contributing cause to the continuing inability of 
Congress to agree on appropriate regulatory legislation. 
So far I have been discussing only the interests of the 
bureaucratic actors themselves. The eagerness of a 
mi.ssion bureaucracy to develop technological programs 
is not driven entirely by internal considerations of 
course. Special interests in the agency's constituencies 
also work for such policies where it serves their 
purposes. Observation suggests that the constituency of 
the Bureau of Reclamation is especially intereste,d in 
operational weather modification. Quite simply, the 
beneficiaries of Reclamation projects are the land 
owners and water users of the arid western states and the 
congressional representatives of those interests. The 
benefits of an aggressive development program in 
weather,modification are of two types: in the short run 
money; and in the long run, perhaps, water. Anyone 
familiar with life in the West knows that water means- -
money to landowners. 
Short-run inoney comes primarily in the form of 
research contracting. It was noted above that Project 
Skywater began "with the understanding that a good 
portion of the work should go to Sou th Dakota." 42 It 
has. South Dakota (primarily the South Dakota School 
of Mines and Technology) has received more Project 
Skywater money-$5,160,000-than any other state. 
Wyoming and Nevada, both dry states consistently 
supporting reclamation, are second and third in amount 
of money received, with $3,900,000 and $3,300,000 
respectively as of 1969. 43 Former Chairman of the 
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Wayne 
Aspinall of Colorado, a long time friend of Dominy and 
of reclamation, obtained for his State the largest number 
of individual contracts. 44 These include the contracts 
for one of the three big pilot projects, which, interest-
ingly enough, is an attempt to increase snow fall in the 
headwaters of the San Juan River, which is a major 
tributary of the Colorado River. The third pilot project 
is being organized in South Dakota of all places. Thus 
does traditional American pork barrelling determine 
technological policy. 
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Aside from immediate money, the hope of future water 
production is the driving special interest behind federal 
weather modification policy. In the West water is the 
crucial constraint on almost every political and 
economic decision. The thirst of the western states and 
the intimate interrelation of agency and constituent 
interest in "rain making" is perhaps best dramatized 
along the Colorado River. The seven Colorado Basin 
States 45 have vied with each other for years over the 
muddy flows of the Southwest's great river. At one time 
Arizona even sent its sent National Guard to stop work 
on a dam being built to divert water to California. After 
years of political struggle, a seven State compact, and 1 
years of court fighting, the Supreme Court finally 
allocated the flow of the Colorado River between the 
seven basin States in Arizona v California, 46 a decision 
that was a landmark in federal-state relations. 47 Billions 
of dollars have been spent or authorized to build the 
numerous reclamation projects in the seven states for 
diverting the waters.in accordance with the Arizona v 
California allocation scheme. But now it appears that 
that allocation was based on an inaccurate prediction of 
the annual flows of the river and those at the end of 
the construction list face the possibility of nearly empty 
canals. In 1968, for example, Congress authorized 1.4 
billion dollars for the giant Central Arizona Project after 
a 20 year political struggle. The CAP is to divert 
Arizona's allotted 1.2 million acre feet (mat) of water 
from the river and carry it to the Phoenix area. Yet at 
the time of passage of the act the Bureau itself estimated 
that by 1979 (when the project was to begin carrying 
water) only 1.1 maf of water would be available, and by 
1990 only 500,000 acre-feet could be diverted due to 
increased upstream consumptive use. With decreasing 
amounts of water the economic feasibility of the CAP 
and many other projects will be seriously jeopardized if 
not destroyed altogether. 48 Yet huge investments in real 
estate, agriculture, industrial development, and urban 
growth (to say nothing of bureaucratic prestige) depend 
on the original CAP p~ans. The substantial financial 
interests backing the CAP are indicative of the power 
that stands behind water supply issues in the West: the 
Central Arizona Project Association is a lobbying group 
formed in 1947 and still in existence with plush offices 
in Phoenix and Washington, D.C. Its board of directors is 
heavily stocked with farming and farm related business 
interests, real estate interests, utilities, mayors, bankers 
and lawyers. 49 These interests along with their Bureau 
are caught in the muck of the diminishing river. This is 
the kind of special interest constituency that fuels 
Nevada Senator Bible's excitement in response to Bureau 
of Reclamation requests for weather modification 
appropriations: 
"When the Bureau of Reclamation testified before our 
Appropriations Committee that an additional inch of 
precipitation above Glen Canyon (Bureau of Reclamation Dam 
on the Colorado River) would produce a runoff of 575,000 
acre-feet, believe me, that sounded like something that should 
be accelerated without delay. "'0 
In summary, we have seen that the legal system has 
favored weather modification technology at the federal 
level by adoption of an affirmative policy of rapid 
development of practical weather control technique. 
This policy is being pursued "without delay." Overall 
administrative coordination which might seek to 
accommodate a wide range of potentially affected public 
interests is being avoided as an "interference." Similarly, 
strict scientific discipline, which would proceed more 
cautiously or even skeptically, is by-passed in favor of 
the engineering bias of mission agencies. This lop-sided 
pro-technology policy is explainable in terms of response 
to a multiplicity of highly organized special interests 
who have special access to law making bodies. In the 
case of the largest federal weather modification program 
the controlling agency itself has identifiable bureaucratic 
interests favoring the current policy and its powerful 
special interest constituency (Western land and water 
owners) are vitally concerned with any new source of 
water that might be developed: 
The crucial point to be noted is the structural advantage 
given to the organized pro-technology interests within 
the federal legal system. Through the existence and 
intervention of a similarly interested mission bureaucra-
cy and its Congressional supporters, these interests have 
highly and specially favorable access to the legislature. 
B. State Legisilation 
Of the fifty States, 29 have been found to have some 
kind of legislation directly concerning weather 
modification activites. 51 Since we have seen that there is 
no federal regulation of weather modification activities 
it should be noted that absence of any state regulation 
means absence of any regulation. 
Only four of the 29 States having legislation depart from 
the pattern of pro-technology found across the nation. 
Maryland, a state not known for its water shortages, 
prohibits weather modification within its boundaries. 52 
Two states, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, likewise not 
frequently drought-ridden, have enacted laws that have 
been criticized as "obviously hostile to weather 
modification." 5" This "obvious hostility" is manifested 
by law prescribing a license requirement, financial 
responsibility requirements for operators, and the 
creation of an administrative board empowered to award 
compensation damages: 
"Any licensee who causes a drought as determined by the 
board shall compensate farmers for damages. Any licensee who 
by causing heavy downpours or storms which shall cause. 
damage to lands as determined by the board shall compensate 
farmers and property owners for such damage. " 54 
The other maverick state is Hawaii which authorizes 
only investigation of the feasibility of weather ,modi fica-
tion. 55 
Putting aside these minor aberrations the dominant 
feature of the state laws is their encouragment of 
weathe{ modification. This is done first by minimizing 
35 
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governmental interference with experimenters. 
Regulations tend to be minimal; frequently little more 
than registration is necessary to obtain a license, if, 
indeed, a license is even required. For example, since 
1951 a license has been required to attempt weather 
control in California. But even today, to obtain a license 
from the State Water Resource Board all one has to do is 
file certain information and pay a nominal fee. The 
Board has neither authority nor duty to review 
qualifications of applicants, nor to regulate where and 
when experiments shall take place. 56 
Another method of State encouragement of weather 
technology takes the form of definite legislative policy 
statements. Thus Wyoming law declares that the State 
has "sovereign rights" to atmospheric moisture over its 
territory and that research and experimentation in 
weather modification "shall be encouraged." 57 
Oklahoma's legislature has declared that atmospheric 
water is a natural resource open to exploitation. 58 
Nebraska law declares: The state of Nebraska claims its 
sovereign right to the use, for the best interests of its residents, 
of the moisture contained in the clouds and atmosphere within 
its sovereign state boundaries. ssa 
That such frequently made legislative claims are utterly 
ludicrous in light of the realities of an interconnected 
global weather system should be immediately clear. 
An early advocate of weather modification in Oklahoma, 
one State Senator Pruett, placed a bill before the 
legislature suggesting yet a third approach to State 
encouragement of technology. The proposal stated: 
"any rain that may be superinduced by the use of dry ice ... is 
hereby declared to be the Act of God, and no person can 
predicate any claim for damages on a rain so produced, and 
the Board of Agriculture and those acting under and by their 
authority shall be free from all injunction remedies in the 
execution of the provisions of this Act. " 59 ' 
Such sweeping immunity from liability has not been 
granted to weather modifiers. However State laws do 
offer practical limitation of liability to would-be rain 
makers in several ways and this may be of considerable 
importance in ecouraging development of the technol-
ogy. Texas, for example, has legislatively denied any 
claims against weather modifiers based on the doctrine 
of strict liability. 60 One is reminded of 19th Century 
New England courts refusing to adopt the,principle of 
Rylands v Fletcher in mill pond dam bursting cases. As 
of 1968, before adoption of the Texas, Pennsylvania, and 
West Virginia laws mentioned, one writer examining the 
23 State laws then in existence found "no statutes which 
purport to affect the· liability of operators." 61 The reply 
that would-be plaintiffs are still left free to pursue 
remedies under standard common law or equitable 
doctrines in the courts is suprerficial. Given the almost 
insuperable problems of proof 62 and the obseived fact 
that "not one of the suggested (common law) doctrines 
really fits the weather modification model," 63 the 
practical result is bound to be a great strategic advantage 
to the developers and users of the technology when 
litigation arises. 
Finally, some states have adopted overt legal aids to the 
further elaboration of weather control technique. 
Several state laws enable local government units to 
undertake weather modification projects and finance 
them out of local tax revenues. For example, California 
law provides: 
"Any county, city, city and county, district, authority or 
other public corporation or agency which has the power to 
produce, conserve, control or supply water for beneficial 
purposes shall have the power to engage in practices designed 
to produce, induce, increase or control rainfall or other 
precipitation for the general benefit of the territory within 
it. "64 . 
Similarly, North Dakota authorizes the creation of 
county wide weather control Commissions and gives 
these commissions power to levy a property assessment 
to finance their operations. 65 Nebraska goes even 
further in authorizing the creation of single purpose 
weather modification districts-similar to irrigation 
districts-with powers of tax assessment. Boundaries of 
these districts need not follow existing political 
divisions. 66 
Thus, in many significant ways the predominant trend in 
state legislation on weather modification is toward 
hastening technological experimentation and develop-
ment. Interference by government is extremely limited.; 
in fact in several states government is itself actively 
engaged in the experimentation process. Forums for 
consideration or protection of interests other than 
increased precipitation are practically non-existent. 
While affirmitively encouraging experimentation, state 
laws with few exceptions do not create new methods of 
protecting those potentially damaged. 
The policy developed by state legislatures should clearly 
be understood as reflecting the influence of the same 
kind of constituency interests identified in the federal 
program developments. It is to be noted that the only 
states with limiting statutes are states where water 
supply is not a significant problem (except as to the 
quality of the water supply). In the dry states where 
water is vital to fortune the laws have been hospitable. 
Without exhaustive search for evidence we can strongly 
suggest that agricultural and real estate interests exercise 
considerable influence in such states through powerful 
water and irrigation boards. Another interesting set of 
actors in some states appears to be public utility 
companies who seek more run-off from mountain water 
sheds behind their hydro-electric dams. Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company of California has been one of the long 
time experimenters in the field and no doubt has 
considerable influence on California law. 
It should also be noted that the federal research grant 
program discussed above might be an incentive to the 
enactment of encouraging state laws at least in the 
Bureau of Reclamation's 17 State western empire. State 
legislatures would be loath to cut off the flow of federal 
grants by restriction of experimentation. 
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C. Courts and Commentators-the legal profession 
generally. 
We have seen that weather modification law made in 
legislative arenas has been almost uniformly and quite 
narrowly pro-technology. Interests other than the 
immediate concern for precipitation increase and 
resulting monetary values have not been accounted for, 
with the limited exception (in a few states) of possible 
damage to property. We have seen how this legal 
response is a result of the political pressures of organized 
special interests that have been in positions to influence 
the relevant legislative bodies of the legal system. We 
now tum to a consideration of what, for convenience, 
we may call judicial lawmaking. Our focus will be on 
courts and commentators, those two parts of the legal 
system which contribute to law making through 
authoritative pronouncements of' discovered" Jaw on 
one hand, and more or less respected analysis, criticism, 
and suggestion on the other. It is convenient to treat the 
two together here partly because of their clear mutual 
responsiveness and dependency and partly because of 
the paucity of actual court decisions on the subject of 
weather modification. 
It is generally thought that the Jaw making of courts and 
the associated work of legal scholarship are not normally 
subject to direct influence by the kind of political lobby 
pressures we have seen working in the legislative field. 
One might assume therefore, that the response to 
weather modification of the non-legislative branches of 
the legal system might be somewhat more balanced 
between technological and non-technological interests. 
Such an assumption would be contrary to the facts. The 
following brief survey of the cases and literature shows 
that the response of the judicial branch of the legal 
system has been at least as narrowly pro-technology as 
that of the legislatures. 
When the possibility of weather modification first began 
to emerge as a realistic one lawyers realized the potential 
for conflict inherent in the use of such technology. As 
"law, like nature, abhors a vacuum," 67 it was not long 
before legal scholars began to write on the subject. From 
the earliest articles, however, there has been consistent 
unquestioning commitment to technological "'progress" 
in weather control. Ellul has described the modern 
commitment to technology generally: 
'Technological automatism may not be judged or questioned; 
immediate use must be found for the most recent, efficient, 
an:l technical process ... The worst reproach modem society 
can level is the charge that some person or system is impeding 
this technical automatism." 68 
Legal scholars and courts have avoided the possibility of 
being so reproached. They seem to have conceived their 
role simply in terms of doing everything possible to 
manipulate rules and institutions to facilitate rapid 
development of the new technology. 
Thus even sacred institutions are not to stand in the 
way. After observing that "it is of utmost importance 
that further development in the field be encouraged," 
one early legal writer suggesting lines for development of 
state legislation in the l 950's said, 
"Under the American free-enterprise industrial system, 
competition is considered one of the significant factors making 
for material progress ... No extended economic analysis is 
intended here, except to suggest that in an infant industry, 
such as rainmaking, it is difficult and possibly unwise to 
prevent pioneers from acquiring a favored position ... In cases 
where a rainmaker has amassed the capital and the 'know-how' 
for properly evaluating his own work, a good case may be 
made for giving him a priority for a limited period of time ... 
a limited protected position might well be a better stimulus to 
further development than allowing free competition. " 69 ' 
Another typical writer glowingly pictures the "rivers 
flowing through the skies" ?O and concludes a second 
article by observing: 
"There is no doubt that this system (the existing legal scheme 
c. 1969-70) has its defects, but the fact that we have used it as 
our legal framework for weather changing testifies to its 
advantages. It is fair to say that this system has not unduly 
hampered the growth of weather modification. Unfortunately 
neither has it fostered the field, and that is what is 
needed." 71 
One article 72 displays a virtual sacrifice of legal 
reasonsing on the altar of technological progress. The 
authors discuss the variety of common law doctrines 
previously suggested as analogies for use in analyzing 
private law liability problems potentially arising from 
weather modification. They then construct a theoretical 
continuum of these doctrines according to their liability 
outcomes. One extreme is occupied by the "natural 
rights theory which would practically foreclose weather 
modification." The other extreme is the ferae naturae, 
oil and gas, and surface water set, i.e. the "capture right" 
doctrines, whereby there would be virtually unlimited 
scope for weather modifiers. Then there is a compromise 
group of doctrines centering around riparian analogies 
which suggest the imposition of a 'reasonableness" test. 
Without explaining the selectivity of their value scales, 
the authors assert that "such compromises present 
superior solutions because they strike a balance between 
~/ 
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protection of property and technological advance-
ment." 73 Then comes the coup. While the compromise 
solutions are superior they are unfortunately impossible 
to apply because of the miserable state of scientific 
knowledge and consequent impossibility of proof. There 
being (a priori?} "no basis" for prohibition of cloud 
seeding, "by process of elinimation only the policy of 
unrestrained weather control activity by all landowners 
remains to define the weathermaker's liability ... " 74 In 
passing the authors also note their conviction that "a 
non-liability principle is also desirable in light of 
potential benefits which may result from experimen-
tation." 75 
Many of the articles are not so blatant as these examples, 
but still display the same unquestioning commitment to 
technological development without consideration of 
alternative interests. The goal of the work is explained as 
facilitating "sane logical development" or "applying the 
legal rules permitting the capture and reasonable use for 
the water in the air." 76 
Several major articles do not make explicit statements in 
favor of technology, but nevertheless display a clear 
attitude of inevitability about it. Thus one of the earliest 
writers on the subject says: 
"That experimentation and research in the modification and 
control of weather will continue until its possibilities are fully 
explored, and that legal obstructions must somehow be 
removed, are virtually certain." 
(emphasis added)71 
In the climate created by such commentary, a one-sided 
response of courts faced with baffling questions of 
weather modification is not surprising. There have been 
very few reported court decisions concerning weather 
modification, but the impact of these few is definitely 
favorable to technological development. The earliest 
reported case found was Slutsky v New York City 78 
which arose from attempts by the City of New York to 
increase precipitation on its watershed in the Catskill 
Mountains. A resort owner in the area sought an 
injunction on the grounds that increased rainfall would 
harm his resort business. The court adopted a rough 
nuisance-like balancing test and concluded that the 
landowner had no rights in clouds, their moisture, or the 
natural state of the weather, at least when balanced 
against the needs of the City for water. The injunction 
was denied. 
Plaintiffs seeking damages have encountered an immense 
problem of proof. The most celebrated damages case 
involved cloud seeding in the Sierra Nevada Moun-
tains. 79 The extraordinary problems of proof are 
discussed by counsel for defendant in a recent article. 80 
The plaintiffs had the advantage of numerous public 
statements made by both the commercial operator and 
its customer, Pacific Gas and Electric Co., advertising the 
effectiveness of their cloud seeding techniques. Even so, 
the plaintiffs failed to make out their case. Similarly, 
failure of proof was the reason for denying an injunction 
in a Pennsylvania case where the judfe was evidently 
quite sympathetic to the plaintiffs. 8 
The only case found where plaintiffs succeeded against 
"rain makers" was a Texas case (Southwest Weather 
Research, Inc. v Jones} 82 in which certain ranchers 
obtained a preliminary injunction against a hail 
suppression project over neighboring lands. Their theory 
was that the rainfall on their own lands would also be 
suppressed. The trial and decision of the case is worth 
comment because even though the plaintiffs got an 
injunction, the case and scholarly writing immediately 
following it are still favorable to technological change in 
a perverse way. In the trial both parties introduced a 
confusing array of conflicting expert testimony. 
Confronted with what seemed to be unfathomable 
scientific riddles the court finally decided the case on 
the basis of "eyewitness testimony.' Several of 
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plaintiffs' witnesses testified that they saw clouds 
dissipate after they were seeded. No knowledgeable 
meteorologist would accept such ''evidence" as 
establishing anything, but it was all the court had to go 
on and a case demanded decision. The injunction was 
issued. The basic irrationality of the decision is 
emphasized by the action of the Texas Supreme Court. 
The injunction was upheld, but modified so as to 
prohibit seeding only directly over plaintiffs' lands. 
The decision was commented upon by numerous writers 
and generally criticized as not inquiring into the 
"reasonableness" of the activities as against plaintiffs' 
absolute claims of right. 83 However, the failure of the 
comment writers to recognize or discuss the clear 
institutional incapacity shown by such a case is 
significant. The Southwest Weather Research case 
strongly suggests that traditional legal institutions may 
well be incapable of providing rational solutions to 
problems of weather modification because of inform-
ational inadequacies, lack of expertise, and the 
inappropriateness of courts attempting to undertake 
administrative functions in a complex scientific field. 
Technological innovation is facilitated by the compla-
cent notion that existing legal institutions are capable 
of handling complex problems likely to be created by 
the technology's use. 
Although some of the more recent writing in the field 
has recognized the inappropriateness of courts as a 
forum for issues of weather modification. 84 It suffices 
to say that most of the literature is solidly in the 
complacent mold. 
Thus, the decisions of courts and the scholarly writing 
concerning weather modification have been overwhelm-
ingly pro-technology in minimizing impediments to 
development of weather modification techniques. In 
marked similarity to the result noticed in the trends of 
state legislation, the only competing value expressed 
(and that only to a limited extent) is occassional notice 
of claims of private property owners. This notice is 
confined generally to appeals to a vague and undefined 
"reasonableness" test. 
At first consideration this may seem to be a surprising 
finding, for, as noted above, it is often suggested that 
courts are the branch of the legal system where wealthy 
or specially organized interests have the least special 
advantages to bring to bear on lawmaking. Whereas 
everyone knows that legislatures respond primarily to 
organized special interest groups and lobbying tactics, 
there is a mythology that courts and the surrounding 
legal scholarship of the profession are relatively well 
insulated from such raw force. Hence, says the 
mythology, courts are more equally balanced between 
organized interests and competing diffuse public 
interests. The "flavor of equality" thought to infuse the 
courts and the work of scholarly commentators is 
supposed to offer chances for the poor or unorganized 
or non-professional to influence policy that they would 
not be able to affect in the political arena. See, for 
example, Dolbeare's study of the role of courts in urban 
politics, finding that courts tend to be used for political 
purposes most frequently by isolated interests. 85 
Similarly, a well known environmental lawyer (who 
began his work before recent proliferation of environ-
mental organizations) confides that his strategy of 
defending the environment was based on using the 
courts to the fullest extent possible to create rules and 
publicity that might later lead to success in political 
channels. 86 
How does it happen, then, that the goals of the various 
pro-technology special interests we have seen at work in 
the legislative arenas have equally triumphed in the 
non-legislative branch of the legal system? Surely the 
simple political pressure model will not explain this 
result. Rather the answer lies in more subtle structural 
biases of the judicial system of decision making, biases 
which prevent effective representation of the kinds of 
values and interests that might be found ranged opposite 
the value of technological development. 
The first such systematic bias is found in the nature of 
the intellectual work lawyers (we use the term to include 
judges too) traditionally do. When confronted with a 
problem lawyers typically use a very narrow intellectual 
approach. The problem is defined only in terms of' legal 
issues." This results in the approach to "solutions" 
primarily through manipulation of a set of traditionally 
recognized doctrines or categories. Weber referred to this 
phenomenon of the legal system as "autonomy" -the 
tendency to seek principles of normative ordering 
exclusively from within the existing framework of 
doctrines. Aspects of a problem not related to an 
existing doctrine are all too often just left out of the 
analysis. 
The strength of this tendency oflegal thinking is 
demonstrated quite clearly in the materials reviewed. 
The articles generally begin with perfunctory observa-
tions to the effect that everyone is concerned about the 
weather (but little discussion of why or in what ways, 
which might after all be relevant to rule making about 
weather). The analyses are thereafter confined to a 
search through existing law and institutions for 
appropriate "analogies"-existing legal principles or 
structures that could be stretched or warped to fit 
totally new but narrowly defined problems. 
Legal scholars interested in weather modification 
embarked on heroic excursions through the common law 
searching for these 'analogies." It was simply assumed 
from the start that "property" was a relevant category. 
In fact, most of the legal writers defined their whole 
view of the problem only in terms of property and 
balancing property rights with the need to advance 
science and technology. 87 Thus property rights of some 
kind had to be found, and "Who Owns the Clouds?" 88 
became the question of the day. Dusty old common law 
doctrines like ad coelum were brushed off to suggest 
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"'Who owns the clouds?' becomes the question of the day." 
that landowners obviously own the clouds over their 
property, while ferae naturae was named as suggesting 
that whoever "captured" the clouds clearly should 
"own" them and their moisture. Another theory 
appealed to was a sort of "natural rights" doctrine, Le. 
one who owns property has a right to the enjoyment of 
the natural precipitation that might fall on it. 
This latter theory, of course, was the one upholding the 
temporary injunction in the South West Weather 
Research, Inc. case, 89 the one case in which "rain 
making" was enjoined. As noted above, there were 
numerous published comments on the case. 90 They are 
illuminating examples of "autonomy." We have noted 
the disquieting obliviousness of the authors to both the 
scientific absurdity of the case and the fact that 
realistically the outcome probably didn't make any 
difference whatsoever. The writers of these articles did 
energetically quibble with doctrinal aspects of the 
decision however. Did the court in effect adopt a 
trespass theory or was it nuisance? Was the scope of the 
injunction consistent with the theory adopted? Which 
theory was more appropriate? What other property or 
liability doctrines are applicable? That weather 
modification might involve important human values 
unrelated to land ownership and that these might be or 
should be of interest to the legal system did not seem to 
be apparent. 
The search for analogies continued. In addition to 
theories drawn strictly from land ownership various 
writers have looked for analogies in water law (riparian 
rights, prior appropriation, surface, and percolating 
ground water), oil and gas law, and the usual gamut of 
tort liability theories from negligence through ultra-
hazardous activity 91 (although the latter is uniformly 
rejected as a roadblock to progress). The conclusions 
have varied, but the method has been the same. 
Nor have the more recent and superficially more 
enlightened commentaries departed from this mold. For 
example, two recent writers discuss the earlier material 
on private law doctrines and conclude that they are 
inadequate. The authors cite "the difficulties inherent in 
resolving problems by borrowing established doctrine 
from supposedly 'analogous' situations ... " 92 Yet they 
still see "the critical area of liability for damages" as the 
only problem worthy of their consideration and after 
finding present state and federal legislation insufficient 
propose a "different legal approach." This creative new 
approach turns out to be another analogy. The Atomic 
Energy Commission Act is cited practically in full with 
the insertion of the words weather modification in place 
of "atomic energy. " 92 In place of the search for an 
infinitely elastic common law analogy we are given a 
search for an infinitely elastic institutional structure 
analogy. 
We suggested above that this traditional intellectual 
technique of the legal profession was a bias that 
contributed to the one-sidedness of the rules and policy 
we discovered. At first glance it may seem anomalous 
that adherence to a traditional intellectual approach to 
problems through application of equally traditional 
categories and doctrines should result in a strong bias in 
favor of technological change. Yet the anomaly is only 
superficial. The extremely narrow definition of problems 
which results from the legal approach is conducive to 
change because it reduces the friction that might result 
from intellectual approaches embracing a wider range of 
potentially affected values. In economic terms. the 
traditional method of legal analysis assures that the 
externalities for which a new technological enterprise 
will be accountable are kept to a minimum. An historical 
example of this same.phenomenon has already been 
suggested. In 1868 the landmark case of Rylands v 
Fletcher 94 was decided in England. The decision held 
liable for damages without proof of negligence the 
builder of a pond whose water mysteriously flooded a 
neighboring colliery. The new doctrine stated in that 
case was emphatically rejected by almost all American 
jurisdictions in the years following. Both judges and 
commentators participated in this rejection in favor of 
the then traditional negligence doctrines. Even in the 
cases seemingly most analogous to the factual setting of 
Rylands v Fletcher, e.g. bursting mill pond dams, 
liability was found only on proof of negligence. Prosser 
suggests a reason for such rejection which is particularly 
relevant to the present point: 
"Dangerous enterprises, involving a high degree of risk to 
others, were clearly indispensable to the industrial and 
commercial development of a new country and it was 
considered that the interests of those in the vicinity of such 
enterprises must give way to them, and that too great a burden 
must not be placed on them."95 ' 
In other words, adherence to traditional doctrines 
helped further technological change by narrowly 
construing responsibility for externalities. 
The significance of narrow definition of legal problems 
in the process of technological development can also be 
seen by contrasting the limited property-liability focus 
oflegal work on weather modification with other 
possible intellectual approaches to the problem. For 
example, a systematic ecological approach to weather 
modification describes a vastly more complex and subtle 
range of problems, and in the process draws our 
attention to a much wider range of values. 96 The 
ecological approach demands consideration of the fact 
that all parts of a living eco-system are inter-related and 
inter-dependent in ways we may not yet understand. It 
urges us to recognize that any intervention in a natural 
system such as the weather is bound to have perhaps 
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unknowable effects displaced in time and space from our 
present interventionist activities. The atmosphere is seen 
as not just a source of water supply. It is one of the 
crucial determinants of every living eco-system and vital 
to both local and regional environmental balances. For a 
similar intellectual approach to technological change see 
Wesley Marx's discussion of the emerging technologies of 
ocean exploration and exploitation in The Frail Oceans. 
His starting point for suggesting guidelines for human 
intervention in the oceans is the concept that the oceans 
are an "environment" rather than merely a "re-
source." 97 By conceptualizing the sea as an environment 
attention is drawn to the complex internal network of 
life, energy, stability and change, and a fuller apprecia-
tion of the effects of human activities-both good and 
bad-may be hoped for. The result is a rather more 
cautious set of prescriptions than those we have seen 
produced for weather modification. I would argue that it 
is imperative that rules for guidance of weather 
modification (and here I mean both intentional and 
unintentional) be developed from a similar conceptuali-
zation of the atmosphere as an environment rather than 
merely a resource. Unfortunately, even in fields outside 
the law, it seems that "resource" thinking pre-
dominates. 98 
From an expanded perspective of the atmosphere 
artificial manipulation of the weather naturally involves 
much more than just a contest between different sets of 
landowners over precipitation "rights." Likewise, an 
approach that would seek out a wide range of human 
interests in weather through a careful inter-disciplinary 
social science study would raise manifold difficulties for 
quick development of technology. It is interesting to 
note one such study pertaining to weather modification 
was attempted by a special committee of the National 
Science Foundation shortly before the termination of 
the NSF research program. 99 The Task Group on 
Human Dimensions of the Atmosphere was composed of 
natural and social scientists who studied a wide range of 
human interactions with climate and weather. Their 
primary conclusion in almost every area of the 
study-health, economic production, psychology, 
political behavior, etc.-was, as we have previously 
noted, that virtually nothing is presently known about 
the influence of weather on human behavior and human 
values. 
It is not at all far-fetched to suggest that a truly sound 
system of normative ordering concerning intervention in 
the weather must be based on such knowledge. But by 
proceeding with the drastically circumscribed methods 
of traditional legal thinking, the legal system has avoided 
the necessity of waiting for the complex investigations 
that would be required to gain understanding of such 
difficult questions; the legal system thereby helps speed 
a new technology into practice long before we know 
enough to understand its potential effects or to control 
it effectively. 
Such a systematic failure seems almost built in to the 
legal profession by certain important aspects of legal 
education. Reisman has noted the "unidimensional" 
nature of much of the legal academician's "intellectual 
craftsmanship." 100 He also suggests that this feature of 
professional legal scholarship seems to serve an 
important function within at least the academic corners 
of the profession-it allows easy ranking of members by 
their performance of a fairly standardized task. Those 
who go outside the standardized mode are quite often 
seen as heretics. Thus, the ability to extend one's 
intellectual powers creatively in to fields of knowledge 
outside the law is not ranked highly in law school 
faculty recruitment. 101 Legal education perpetuates the 
myopic approach to complex problems of change by 
failure to reach for new sources of ideas and principles: 
"And yet in the main, the ties between the law schools and the 
other social sciences have remained fragmentary and at times 
even frivolous, mere snippets thrown into a collection of cases 
and materials to show that the professor is au courant. 102 
What Riesman says of social sciences can only be 
amplified when it comes to natural sciences. 
There is a second important source of bias in the legal 
system that contributes to the results we have seen. This 
bias lies deep in the structure of the judicial process 
itself and in the related relationship of lawyers as a 
professional group to the same kind of organized 
interests which wield special power in the legislative 
halls. To discuss this point we must return to an analysis 
of the kinds of interests and values that may be involved 
in weather modification choices. 
Interests or values that might be invoked in opposition 
to weather modification technology are largely 
unorganized and seemingly abstract or amorphous. 
Opposition to weather modification technology is 
associated with concern for ecological balances, a 
quasi-religious desire to preserve natural processes, fear 
of adopting new technologies with insufficient 
knowledge of possible adverse consequences, 103 
reluctance to entrust decisions about weather to political 
or other authority, and, not infrequently, a vague sense 
of opposition to the increasing dominion of technology 
over life in general. Such interests are not likely to be 
backed by significant economic resources. More 
importantly, however, they are unlikely to be organized 
around any specific common purpose. Advancement of 
such values does not result in direct monetary or other 
tangible gain; in fact in some cases economic loss is 
perceived by many people as a result of successful 
implementation of such values. 
We have already seen the kind of interests that line up in 
favor of rapid development of technology in this field. 
Among these were the mission bureaucracies of the 
federal government, land owners in arid parts of the 
country to whom increased precipitation means 
increased value of land and related investments, 
hydro-electric utility companies, municipalities, and 
agricultural interests. To most of these interests 
ownership of property that may be directly affected by 
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weather modification leads to the perception of 
potential direct economic gains derivable through 
application of expanded technology. Costs to be borne 
by similar economic interests are sometimes thrown in 
the balance; costs to be borne by counter-technology 
interests are not. 
In the case of identifiable pro-technology interests there 
is both existing political and economic power and the 
likelihood of increasing that power through the 
economic benefits potentially derivable from the 
technology. More importantly, it will immediately be 
seen that the central organizing feature of the pro-
technology interests is property. By focusing its inquiries 
on property, therefore, the judicial system is assured of 
limiting its field of vision entirely to the range of values 
and interests most likely to favor technological 
development. 
This observation raises the essential question. Is it 
merely accidental that the traditional legal constructs 
used by lawyers in defining and anlyzing "legal" 
problems of weather modification revolve around 
property? The answer of course is no. 
A simple view of why the focus on property is a result of 
systematic bias rather than accident could be a straight 
economic one. Certainly the legal profession is biased 
toward property interests of various kinds simply 
because they tend to be the interests which are 
sufficiently organized and have the money to pay for 
legal services in a fee system. One can add to this simple 
assertion refinements directed toward social class 
distinctions and professional role norms and, reaching a 
"neo-Marxist sys thesis," hope to explain much of the 
observed bias of the system. Thus we would point to 
such cozy get-togethers of la\vyers and special interest 
representatives as that displayed in a recent published 
symposium on weather modification. io4 Lawyers, 
commercial weather modifiers, insurance agents, and 
land owners were the main participants in the three day 
event, all apparently urgining each other "to get down to 
business." But viewing the lawyer as a hired gun working 
for the highest bidder doesn't explain all. At the very 
least there is still the question of why the bias in favor of 
pro-technology interests should be so strong even among 
the scholars who supposedly are independent of market 
pressures. Perhaps there is a more subtle cause at work. 
The search for this cause leads us to look chiefly at the 
interaction between the structure.of the judicial process 
and legal thinking. In the first place we must recall the 
idea of ''autonomy" of the legal system, suggested by 
Max Weber and well illustrated by the legal materials on 
weather modification. The legal system tends to define 
problems in terms of a traditional body of doctrine and 
categories. This body of doctrine ·and categories is 
transmitted primarily through legal training and the 
courts. It is commonplace to point out that the 
education of lawyers focuses primarily on the study of 
what courts do. It is therefore vital to recognize the kind 
of structural analysis of the work of courts as done by 
Gallanter. 105 As his typology of litigants suggests, 
those who use the courts frequently and repeatedly tend 
to be predominantly those who go to court to vindicate 
property rights of one kind or another. They tend to be 
organized, wealthy interests with existing resources to 
protect or enlarge through repeated use of the law. This 
fact leads to two related results. In the first place the 
most frequent and continuing lawyer-client relationships 
tend to be those where the client is such a property 
interested "repeat player." Secondly, the civil work of 
courts whcih so shapes the education and conceptual 
apparatus oflawyers is predominantly concerned with 
the problems of property interests. Thus in a sense the 
very intellectual tools of the legal profession become 
tied to the special interests of those who are frequent 
and repeated litigators. The traditional body of doctrine 
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"Legal education perpetuates the myopic approach to complex 
problems of change by failure to reach for new sources of 
ideas and principles." 
and ideas used by legal thinkers in defining problems and 
reasoning to solutions is that which has been developed 
largely in response to the problems of those who use law 
and courts to vindicate interests in property. 
Further reflection suggests that in a larger sense the 
whole process of judicial decision making is shaped to 
respond to immediate, concrete, organized, interests of 
which "property" happens to be merely the usual 
common denominator. The fundamental parameters of 
judicial process point in this direction. The adversary 
system, for example, requires focus of evidence and 
argument toward opposing concrete positions. More 
importantly the nature of the decisions called for by the 
process is illustrative of this point. While practical 
outcomes and awards often smack of compromise, in 
theory issues are decided all or nothing; whatever one 
side wins the other side loses. The all or nothing decision 
determines concrete 'rights" rather than harmonizing 
abstract "values." This is another way of stating the 
observation that it is the business of the judicial process 
to decide "cases" rather than to solve problems. 
Perhaps the purest distillation of this structural point 
may be seen in the confused federal law of standing. 
More than merely a threshold procedural question, 
standing goes to the very heart of the definition of 
judical decision-making by focusing attention on the 
nature of the claims that a court is willing to entertain. 
The writing on this subject is too voluminous and well 
known to cite, but we can note that in recent years "the 
leading edge of developing principles of standing has 
been in suits brought "in the public interest" to test 
various governmental decisions. 106 In spite of loosening 
of the older technicalities, the central feature of the 
requirement of standing is still the complaining party's 
allegation of injury in fact-not interest in a problem, 
not a concern for a particular social value, not a desire to 
protect a general public interest. Injury, in both 
phenomenological and legal senses, necessarily implies an 
organized or concrete subject of the harm. Thus even. 
when the Supreme Court says that the alleged injury 
may be to aesthetic values, 107 it appears to mean that 
standing will be granted only to a party who daims not 
merely to represent aesthetic values, but to have such a 
direct articulated claim to the values such that the party, 
not merely the value itself, is injured or diminished by 
the action complained of. This appears to be the 
fundamental rationale of the most recent case in the 
field. 108 
The significance of this seemingly abstract point is that 
even in its liberalized form, the doctrine of standing 
remains an important part of the very definition of 
judicial process in our system. The judicial process of 
decision and rule making extends only to situations 
where a person or group can and will go forward to 
articulate a sufficient nexus with an interest or value to 
be able to establish at status as personally injured rather 
than merely a status as representative. Delimited in this 
way the judicial process is surrounded by systematic 
barriers to effective consideration of values or interests 
which are vague, amorphous, unorganized, speculative, 
spiritual, aesthetic, in short, barriers to consideration of 
the kinds of values that might oppose technological 
development in weather control and other fields. That 
such a fundamental definition of the juducial process is 
in fact widely held may be inferred from the jocularly 
contemptuous reception given to Mr. Justice Douglas' 
suggestion in a recent dissent that environmental objects 
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be given a kind of in rem standing in court to be 
represented by any interested party demonstrating 
competence to undertake the task. 109 
It may well be that judicial process should be con-
strained by such parameters in spite of the various biases 
created. There is no reason to assume that every decision 
making system must extend its methods to encompass 
all aspects of every kind or problem. Different systems 
of decision making may be appropriate for different 
kinds of problems. However the biases must be 
recognized if for no other reason than to be sure that 
biases of one system are corrected somewhere else. For 
the present inquiry the importance of the inherent bias 
of the judicial process of decision may be summarized as 
follows: The basic design of judicial decision making is 
such that barriers are created to consideration of 
unorganized nonconcrete interests and values. In 
everyday working terms this means that the great bulk 
of the work of courts involves only organized special 
interests of which property is the most frequent 
common denominator. It is the work of the courts that 
creates and transmits the body of doctrine and 
categories that lawyers receive as their training and use 
as their intellectual tools. When such basic intellectual 
methods of the profession are joined with the "neo-
Marxist synthesis" of economic and social influence, it is 
easy to see how the methodological bias of the legal 
system is transformed smoothly into substantive bias. 
The result is a profoundly one-sided set of rules and 
prescriptions for handling a new technology, largely by 
intellectual default. 
III Conclusions 
It has been argued throughout this paper that our legal 
institutions tend systematically to ignore public interests 
in contributing to the hasty adoption of new techno-
logies. There are, of course, examples of new tech-
nologies to which the model presented here may seem 
not to apply. An illustrative case is the sad history of 
cable television, a new technology which has been 
almost completely kept out of use in some states 
(Connecticut being a timely prime example) by effective 
legal opposition. However, it must be noticed that the 
opposition to cable television has come almost entirely 
from highly organized and vocal interests who will suffer 
competitively if it is adopted-namely local television 
broadcasting stations. Thus even though the outcome 
has been different-Le. technological innovation largely 
stifled instead of hastened-the fact that the legal 
response to new technologies is predominantly 
controlled by private special interests seems to remain; 
the central fact is the lack of influence of unorganized 
but nonetheless important public interests. In each legal 
arena systematic structural biases favor special. interest 
actors. 
Greater judicial activism to protect public interests is 
much advocated today. In light of this trend it is perhaps 
the failure of the judicial process that stands out as the 
most significant observation of this appraisal of our legal 
apparatus. In the first place we noted a strong suggestion 
of plain institutional incapacity to produce rational 
results in regulation of complex new technologies. Both 
the complexity of the information involved in a weather 
modification controversy and the episodic nature of any 
court's involvement with such issues militate against 
development of ability to handle factual questions 
realistically. The same problems prevent courts from 
providing meaningful administrative guidance. The result 
of complacent ignorance of these institutional incapaci-
ties is basically thoughtless adjudication such as that 
shown by the truncated injunction based on "eye-
witness" testimony in the South West Weather Research 
case, 110 and equally thoughtless commentary, such as 
the recommendation that courts adopt a complete 
non-liability to handle the difficult scientific infor-
mation involved. 111 
Secondly, we noted the failure of the judicial process to 
discover adequate new ideas or intellectual perspectives 
for decisions about new technologies. The search for 
analogies from existing doctrines constrains judicial and 
scholarly thinking and forces the creation oflaw within 
an artificially narrow structure of ideas. Many relevant 
values and interests remain unconsidered. 
Finally we saw that even that narrow range of doctrines 
and ideas which do enter into the judicial rule making 
process are largely the creation of a process in which the 
very interests most likely to be narrowly pro-technology 
have fundamental advantages because of the nature of 
judicial process and its relation to the intellectual work 
of the legal profession. 
Observations not unlike these have been made before in 
other fields. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote: 
The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and has 
often satisfied new demands for justice by invoking analogies 
or by expanding a rule or principle ... But with the increasing 
complexity of society, the public interests tends to become 
omnipresent; and the problems presented by new demands for 
justice cease to be simple. Then the creation or recognition by 
courts of a new private right may work serious injury to the 
general public, unless the boundaries of the right are definitely 
established and wisely guarded. In order to reconcile the new 
private right with the public interest, it may be necessary to 
prescribe limitations and rules for its enjoyment and also to 
provide administrative machinery for enforcing the rules. It is 
largely for this reason that, in the effort to meet the many new 
demands for justice incident to a rapidly changing civilization, 
resort to legislation has latterly been had with increasing 
frequency .112 
With this final suggestion to remand the matter to the 
legislatures the pessimistic outlook comes full circle. For 
in the legislatures the naked political force of special 
interest has carried the day. It is possible for Congress to 
give careful scrutiny to scientific and humanistic 
questions raised by weatheqnodification, but it has not 
done so. It is possible for c'ongress to create a rational 
administrative scheme to consider and protect diverse 
public interests, but it has not done so. 
Thus, with respect to the three questions we offered at 
the beginning of this paper, the appraisal of the relation 
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of law and technological change is not a happy one. 
Rational use of scientific evidence to infonn the law has 
not occurred. Broad representation of a wide range of 
public interests is systematically stifled. Special interest 
politics plays a detenninative role in policy develop-
ment. And, most importantly, in these respects the 
various branches of the legal system do not correct each 
other, one cancelling the bias of the others. Rather the 
effects of structural bias of the legal system are 
cumulative. Are we compelled to accept a totally 
pessimistic outlook? Do these conclusions mean that 
with respect to the problems of new technologies the 
environmental law movement is a futile gesture? I think 
not. The analysis presented here, rather than sounding 
doom, merely indicates ultimate strategies. This is 
because the paradigm described at length in this paper as 
the normal relation of the legal system to technological 
change does occassionally break down. Periodically 
public concern and mobilization of diffuse interests 
reach a critical level and a change is thrust into the 
picture through the legislatures. I would suggest that the 
episodic nature of change in the basic model I have 
described in this paper may be understood as the rough 
political analogue of the process of change in ' nonnal" 
science bl scientific "revolutions" as described by 
Kuhn. 11 The National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 114 and the spate of other environmental 
legislation of the last few years appear to be a partial 
"breakdown" in the paradigm.as I have described it. This 
breakdown has resulted from widespread public alarm 
about and organization around general common interests 
of the kind which normally are not well represented in 
the legal system. 
I submit, therefore, that the realistic strategy of the 
environmental law movement for dealing with new 
technologies is not to rely ultimately on existing legal 
institutions to regulate technology in the public interest. 
Rather, the indicated strategy is essentially political-to 
use the legal system to generate the alann and public 
organization that will lead to further "breakdown" of 
the normal paradigm. 
Two examples from the work of well known environ-
mental law groups suggest that such a basic strategy has 
in fact been chosen. 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. (EDF) is now a 
nationally known organization which organizes scientists 
and lawyers for a cooperative attack on many types of 
environmental problems. It is significant, I think, that 
EDF was founded in an attempt to use the legal system 
to expose disasterous "side effects" of a pesticide 
technology adopted years earlier without sufficient 
safeguards. The strategy was to use the courts as a forum 
from which to reach the public with alarming scientific 
information to stimulate concern and organization. 115 
It is clear that efforts such as these were instrumental in 
bringing about increased public awareness of problems 
of new technologies that Jed to such legislation as the 
National Environemental Policy Act. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), is a 
newer environmental law group which has been very 
active in asserting public interests in various new energy 
technologies such as offshore drilling and nuclear 
reactors. In this activity NRDC has relied heavily on 
NEPA. 
NRDC states that its primary objective is "to provide a 
central, national focus for lawyers, scientists and 
concerned citizens in the effort to make our courts and 
administrative agencies effective instruments of 
environmental protection." 116 A more realistic 
statement of objectives with respect to a new technology 
is implicitly given in a description of the purposes of one 
of the group's legal proceedings. 117 
The United States still does not have a coherent and reasoned 
energy policy .... 
NRDC has pressed the government to develop a rational and 
coherent energy policy. As part of the effort to force the 
government to consider fully the consequences of energy 
development, NRDC filed suit in December 1971, seeking to 
enjoin the lease of more than 300,000 acres in the Gulf of 
Mesico for off-shore oil and gas drilling .... ('The leases by the 
Department were cancelled and the judgment affirmed.) .... 
This is an important initial victory. What is most important is 
to assure that Interior now takes its NEPA mandate seriously 
and that any future lease proposal contains an adequate 
discussion of the reasonable alternatives to the proposed 
action which will aid in developing a more rational national 
energy policy. Out of the process we should in time more 
toward a more coherent energy policy for the nation. 118 
Thus the true objective is not to rely on the courts for 
protective regulation of new technologies, but to use the 
courts as pressure points and educational forums forcing 
negotiation and reassessment by the proponents of 
technology and encouraging education and organization 
of the public. ' Out of the process we should in time 
move toward" a more balanced technology policy for 
the nation. 
In the meantime, examples of the utter failure of the 
legal system to produce balanced policy, such as the case 
of weather modification, must, I think, perplex and 
humble a somewhat overproud profession. 
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